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Abstract
In this paper, we consider a supply chain system with one 
supplier and two homogeneous retailers to investigate 
the influence of distributional and peer-induced fairness 
concerns on supply chain. The Nash bargaining solution 
is used as distributional fairness reference and the first 
retailer’s monetary payoff is used as the peer-induced 
fairness reference. We first analyze the decision-making 
process of the fairness concerned retailers under a given 
wholesale price and make a comparison with the fairness-
neutral counterparts, then we derive the supplier’s optimal 
wholesale price and the retailers’ corresponding optimal 
order quantity in equilibrium. The results show that the 
second retailer orders less product and receives a higher 
wholesale price than the first retailer. The peer-induced 
fairness concerned retailer is in a worse position than the 
distributional fairness concerned retailer.
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Distributional fairness; Peer-induced fairness
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INTRODUCTION
Traditional theories in economics assume that individuals 
are self-interested in their own material payoffs. Recent 
advances in behavioral economics have relaxed the 
assumption and shown that people are not purely self-
interested and always exhibit social preferences in 
many real-life situations (Leon, 1954), such as bounded 
rationality, risk-seeking, loss-averse and so on (Su, 2008; 
Schweitzer & Cachon, 2000; Loch & Wu, 2007; Wang & 
Webster, 2009). Researches in behavioral operation also 
show that people pay much attention to fairness in their 
daily life (Fehr & Schmidt, 1999). Kahneman, Knetsch, 
and Thaler (1986) suggest that firms, like individuals, 
are also motivated by the concern of fairness in business 
relationships. In this paper, we focus on the fairness 
concern and investigate how it affects the supply chain 
with one supplier and two retailers.
There is a growing stream of literatures which study the 
role of fairness concern in the context of supply chain. Cui, 
Raju, and Zhang (2007) incorporate fairness concern into 
a simple dyadic supply chain and investigate the impact of 
fairness concern on channel coordination. The results show 
that the supplier can coordinate the channel by charging a 
simple constant wholesale price above his marginal cost. 
Loch and Wu (2008) provide an experimental evidence 
proving that status seeking induces more competitive 
behavior by both players and drives down individual 
performance and overall efficiency in supply chain. Ho and 
Zhang (2008) confirm the existence of fairness concern in 
the context of supply chain and give a descriptive utility 
function about fairness concern. The fairness concern 
between retailer and supplier has contributed significantly 
to the coordination failure and efficiency loss in supply 
chain when they are not fully informed of other member’s 
fairness concern (Katok, Olsen, & Pavlov, 2012; Katok 
& Pavlov, 2012; Pavlov & Katok, 2012). Du, Du, Liang, 
and Liu (2010) analyze how the retailer’s fairness concern 
affects channel coordination under three different contracts 
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and conclude that the retailer’s fairness concern will not 
change the state of supply chain coordination. Du, Nie, 
Chu, and Yu (2012) extend the model by assuming that 
the supplier and retailer are both fairness concerned and 
establishes a Nash bargaining framework to study the 
newsvendor problem. The results show that the channel 
efficiency decreases because of the fairness concern and the 
state of channel coordination is independent of the fairness 
concern. Ho and Su (2009) is the first to investigate peer-
induced fairness by analyzing two independent ultimatum 
games theoretically and experimentally, which are played 
sequentially by a leader and two followers. It suggests that 
peer-induced fairness concern between followers is two 
times stronger than distributional fairness concern between 
leader and follower.
This paper considers a 1-supplier and 2-retailers 
supply chain and investigates the role of distributional and 
peer-induced fairness concerns on supply chain decision-
making process. We first analyze how distributional 
fairness affects both wholesale price and order quantity 
between a supplier and a retailer. Then we extend the 
model by introducing peer-induced fairness in the system 
where the supplier must determine his wholesale price 
offers to two retailers sequentially. First, the supplier 
offers a wholesale price to the first retailer. Then, the 
second retailer observes the market signal and knows 
exactly how much the first retailer earns. Finally, the 
supplier makes a wholesale price offer to the second 
retailer. The second retailer will make his order quantity 
based on what the first retailer received in order not to be 
behind. The supplier’s optimal wholesale price and the 
retailer’s optimal order quantity may change as a result of 
peer-induced fairness concerns.
Fairness concerns are generally characterized by 
incorporating profit disparity into the utility function. 
Bolton (1991) and Rabin (1993) suggest that both positive 
and negative disparity will reduce individual’s utility. De 
Bruyn and Bolton (2008) improve the asymmetric loss 
function and predict the influence of fairness concern 
on bargaining. Loch and Wu (2008) investigate the 
effects of social preferences on the performance of a 
supply chain and put forward a simple utility function of 
fairness concern: Ui=πi+θiπj. In this paper, we bring in two 
distributional and one peer-induced fairness parameters 
and suppose that the individual’s utility increases when his 
profit is larger than the fairness reference and decreases 
when his profit is smaller than the fairness reference.
In this paper, Nash bargaining solution is used as 
distributional fairness reference to formally depict 
perceptively fair compromise, which is a new perspective 
to study fairness concerns in a supply chain. According to 
Nash Jr (1950), we may regard Nash bargaining solution 
as representing all anticipations that the two bargainers 
might agree upon as fair bargains. Nash bargaining 
solution is characterized by a set of axioms (i.e., Pareto 
efficiency, Symmetry, Invariant to affine transformations 
and Independence of irrelevant alternatives) that are 
appealing in defining fairness (Nash Jr, 1950; Osborne 
& Rubinstein, 1994; Touati, Altman, & Galtier, 2006). 
Additionally, the first retailer’s realized monetary payoff 
is used as peer-induced fairness reference. We assume two 
homogeneous retailers operating in two separate markets, 
which have same market demand. The unique difference 
of them is that the second retailer is peer-induced fairness 
concerned. Therefore, the second retailer regard what 
the first retailer get in the first game as his peer-induced 
fairness reference.
Under the background of newsvendor model, we 
establish a distributional and peer-induced fairness 
concern framework based Nash bargaining solutions. The 
general model predicts that distributional fairness results 
in a smaller order quantity determined by the retailer 
and the second retailer’s optimal order quantity is larger 
than that of retailer 1 when the supplier provides them a 
same wholesale price. In addition, the model predicts that 
the second retailer tends to be radical in order quantity 
comparing with the first retailer and receives a higher 
wholesale price offer. The supplier increases the wholesale 
price offer to the second retailer, because the latter must 
choose an order quantity to balance the opposing forces 
of not being behind the supplier and not being behind the 
first retailer.
The rest of the paper is organized as follow. In section 2, 
we will give the notations of this paper and the benchmark 
newsvendor model, in which individuals only pay attention 
to the material payoffs. Section 3 will first show us how 
to establish the distributional and peer-induced fairness 
model and then analyze the two retailers’ decision-
making process. The equilibrium results of the two games 
are depicted in the last part of Section 3. The role of 
distributional and peer-induced fairness concern on the 
supplier’s optimal wholesale price and the retailer’s optimal 
order quantity are analyzed as well. Section 4 summarizes 
our main conclusions and suggests further directions.
1.  BASIC MODEL: NO FAIRNESS
Let us begin with some notations. We consider a supply 
chain with one supplier (denoted by S) and two retailers 
(denoted as R1and R2). The retailers face the newsvendor 
problem: they must choose an order quantity q before the 
start of a selling season that has stochastic demand under 
a given wholesale price w determined by the supplier. 
We assume that the two retailers operate in two separate 
markets and they have the same but independent demand 
D. Let F be the distribution function of demand and f its 
density function: F is differentiable, strictly increasing and 
F(0)=0. Let F–(x)=1–F(x) and u=E[D]. The retailer price 
is p and the production cost is c. the distributional fairness 
concern parameters are θs, θr and the peer-induced fairness 
concern parameter is λ.
In this section, we consider a setting where there is 
no fairness. That is to say, the supplier and the retailers 
are only interested in their own monetary payoffs. The 
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two retailers play two identical stackelberg games with 
the supplier sequentially, so they have a symmetric 
relationship in the supply chain. Thus, the second game is 
a repetition of the first game. The profits of the retailers, 
the supplier and the whole channel are given below 
respectively:
 ( ) ( ) iiiiri qwqpSq −=π  ( ) iiis qcw −=,π  ( ) iii cqqpS −=π;  ( ) ( ) iiiiri qwqpSq −=π  ( ) iiis qcw −=,π  ( ) iii cqqpS −=π;
 ( ) ( ) iiiiri qwqpSq −=π  ( ) iiis qcw −=,π  ( ) iii cqqpS −=π  (1)
Where i=1,2 represents the two retailers and 
S(q)=q– ( )F y dy
q
0
# ( )dy. According to the traditional normative 
theories, retailer i’s and channel’s optimal order quantities 
in the decentralized and centralized cases, denoted by q*i  
and qi0 , satisfy the following conditions:
 ( ) ( ) pwpqF ii /−=∗  ( ) ( ) pcpqF i /0 −=;  ( ) ( ) pwpqF ii /−=∗  ( ) ( ) pcpqF i /0 −=  (2)
The left of Equation (2) is retailer i’s best response 
function to the supplier’s wholesale price decision. 
The supplier will take the retailer i’s response into 
consideration and make his optimal decision. Substituting 
this function into the supplier’s profit function and 
maximizing the supplier’s profit, we can easily get the 
supplier’s optimal wholesale price w*i  and the retailer i’s 
corresponding optimal order quantity q*i  that satisfy the 
following conditions:
 ( ) ( )i i iw q pF q∗ ∗ ∗=  ( ) ( )1i ipF q g q c∗ ∗ − = ;  ( ) ( )i i iw q pF q∗ ∗ ∗=  ( ) ( )1i ipF q g q c∗ ∗ − =   (3)
Where g(x)=xf(x)/F  – (x), namely generalized failure 
rate (GFR) function. We assume that the GFR function 
is increasing in its probability spaces and we call it 
increasing generalized failure rate (IGFR) function. The 
IGFR function captures most common distributions, 
such as the power, the normal and the exponential etc. 
therefore, it is reasonable to introduce the IGFR function 
into this paper.
2 .   B E H AV I O R A L  M O D E L  W I T H 
FAIRNESS CONCERNS
2.1  Model Formulation
In this section, we extend the basic model by incorporating 
the distributional fairness concerns and peer-induced 
fairness concerns into the supply chain. Specifically, the 
supplier and the retailers are all distributional fairness 
concerned and the second retailer who operates behind 
is peer-induced fairness concerned. The order of events 
is as follow. First, the supplier offers retailer 1 the 
wholesale price w1, and retailer 1 makes his optimal order 
quantity q*1 . Then, the retailer 2 observes the market and 
knows exactly how much retailer 1 earns. Based on this 
information, retailer 2 makes his optimal order quantity 
q*2  responding to w2 in order not to be behind.
Let us define the individual’s utility functions. In game 
1, a linear form is used to formulate the utility of each 
member in the supply chain as follows.
 ( )11 1 1rr r r ru π θ π π= − −  ( )1,1,1,1, sssssu ππθπ −−=;  ( )11 1 1rr r r ru π θ π π= − −  ( )1,1,1,1, sssssu ππθπ −−=      (4)
Where π–r1 and π–s,1 denote the retailer’s and supplier’s 
Nash bargaining fairness references respectively. 
Obviously, πr1+πs,1=π–r1+π–s,1. Their utilities decrease when 
their real monetary payoffs are lower than the Nash 
bargaining fairness references and appear a converse trend 
otherwise. According to the Nash’s axiomatic definition, 
Nash bargaining solution is derived by maximizing the 
following model.
 1 ,1
1 ,1 1
1 ,1
max
. .
0, 0
r s
r s
r s
u u
s t
u u
π π π+ =
> >
 (5)
We can get the supplier’s utility using the right side of 
Equation (4).
 ( ) ( )1,1 1 1 1 1- rs r r s ru π π π θ π π= − −  (6)
Thus,
    ( ) ( ) ( )1 11 ,1 1 1 1 1 1 1-r rr s r r r r r s ru u π π θ π π π π θ π π= − − − −      (7)
Taking the second-order derivation of Equation 
(7) with respect to π r1,  we have ∂
2ur1us ,1/∂
2π r1=–
2(1+θs+θr+θrθs)<0. Hence, ur1us,1(πr1) is strictly concave 
about πr1 and there exists a unique optimal solution, i.e., 
π*r1, that satisfies the first-order condition ∂ur1us,1/∂πr1=0. 
Then, we can derive
 
1 1
1
2
r
r
s r
θ
π π
θ θ
+
=
+ +
 
,1 1
1
2
s
s
s r
θ
π π
θ θ
+
=
+ +
, 
 
1 1
1
2
r
r
s r
θ
π π
θ θ
+
=
+ +
 
,1 1
1
2
s
s
s r
θ
π π
θ θ
+
=
+ +
 (8)
In game 2, the retailer 2 is not only distributional 
fairness concerned but also peer-induced fairness 
concerned. We use a linear form to formulate each 
member’s utility functions in the supply chain, too. The 
retailer’s and supplier’s utility functions are given below 
respectively.
 ( ) ( )22 2 2 1 2rr r r r r ru π θ π π λ π π= − − − −  ( )2,2,2,2, sssssu ππθπ −−=,
 ( ) ( )22 2 2 1 2rr r r r r ru π θ π π λ π π= − − − −  ( )2,2,2,2, sssssu ππθπ −−=  (9)
Here, the Nash bargaining solution is used as the 
distributional fairness concern reference and the peer 
retailer 1’s payoff is used as the peer-induced fairness 
concern reference. If retailer 2 get less than that of retailer 
1, he will feel unfair and his utility decreases.
Accordingly, the Nash bargaining solution (π–r2, π–s,2)is 
derived by maximizing the Nash product ur2us,2. Similarly 
to game 1, we can get the Nash bargaining solution as 
follow.
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 ( ) ( )2 1
2
1
2 2
r s r
r
s r s
θ λ π λ λθ π
π
θ θ λθ λ
+ + + +
=
+ + + +
 ( ) ( )2 1
,2
1
2 2
s s s r
s
s r s
θ λθ λ π λ λθ π
π
θ θ λθ λ
+ + + − +
=
+ + + +
,
 ( ) ( )2 1
2
1
2 2
r s r
r
s r s
θ λ π λ λθ π
π
θ θ λθ λ
+ + + +
=
+ + + +
 ( ) ( )2 1
,2
1
2 2
s s s r
s
s r s
θ λθ λ π λ λθ π
π
θ θ λθ λ
+ + + − +
=
+ + + +
 (10)
The two games are linked together. What the supplier 
offers to retailer 1 in game 1 affects the payoff of retailer 1, 
the retailer 1’s payoff is the peer-induced fairness concern 
reference in game 2, thus what the supplier offers in game 
1 affects the whole game process. We can solve the game 
using the standard backward induction principle. In the 
second game, the supplier choose w2 to maximize us,2. In 
the first game, the supplier choose w1 to maximize us,1+us,2.
2.2  Decision-Making of the Fairness Concerned 
Retailers
In this section, we will analyze how the retailers behave 
under both decentralized and centralized channel. We 
work backward to derive the retailers’ optimal decisions. 
In the second game, we can derive the retailer’s optimal 
order quantity q ,*2 m by maximizing his utility ur2 given by 
Equation (9); In the first game, we can derive the retailer’s 
optimal order quantity q ,*1 i  by maximizing his utility ur1 
given by Equation (4).
Proposition 1. The two retailers’ utility functions are 
strictly concave about their order quantities q1 and q2 and 
there are two optimal order quantities q ,*1 i  and q ,*2 m  that 
maximize their own expected utilities. The two optimal 
order quantities satisfy the following conditions:
 ( )
( )
2
2,
22
2 21
2 2 2 2
1-
2 2
s r sr
s s s s
r
s s
wcF q
p p
c ww
p p
λ
θ θ λθ λθ
θ λθ λ θ λθ λ
θ
θ λθ λ
∗ + + + += + −
+ + + + + +
−
= +
+ + +
 (11)
 ( ) ( )11 11, 21 12 2 2
s r r r
s s s
c ww wcF q
p p p pθ
θ θ θ θ
θ θ θ
∗ −+ += − + = − +
+ + +
 (12)
Proof. We will prove the conclusion in the second 
game first. Taking the first-order derivation of ur2 with 
respect to q2, we have
 ( )( ) ( ) ( ) ( )( ) ( )2 2 2
2
1 2 2 1
1
2 2 2 2
r r s s rr
r
s r s s r s
u p w p c pF q
q
θ θ λ θ λθ λ θ λ
θ λ
θ θ λθ λ θ θ λθ λ
+ + + + + + +∂
= + + − − − −
∂ + + + + + + + +
 ( )( ) ( ) ( ) ( )( ) ( )2 2 2
2
1 2 2 1
1
2 2 2 2
r r s s rr
r
s r s s r s
u p w p c pF q
q
θ θ λ θ λθ λ θ λ
θ λ
θ θ λθ λ θ θ λθ λ
+ + + + + + +∂
= + + − − − −
∂ + + + + + + + +
 (13)
Taking the second-order derivation of ur2 with respect 
to q2, we have
 ( )( ) ( )
2
2
22
2
2 2 1
0
2 2
s s rr
s r s
u pf q
q
θ λθ λ θ λ
θ θ λθ λ
+ + + + +∂
= − <
∂ + + + +
 (14)
Hence, the second retailer’s utility function is strictly 
concave about q2 and there exists a unique maximum 
that satisfies the first-order condition ∂ur2 (q ,
*
2 m)/∂q2)=0. 
Then we can get Equation (11) by solving the first-order 
condition. We can al o prove the conclusion in the first 
game by maximizing ur1 with respect to q1.
In the following discussion, we will show how the 
retailer’s distributional fairness concern and peer-induced 
fairness concern biases his decision. That is, the difference 
in the optimal decisions between a fairness-neutral retailer 
and a fairness concerned retailer.
Proposition 2. For a fairness concerned retailer, his 
optimal order quantity is smaller than its fairness-neutral 
counterpart, which is smaller than the fairness-neutral 
channel’s optimal order quantity.
 
2, 2 2
oq q qλ
∗ ∗< <  1, 1 1
oq q qθ
∗ ∗< <;  2, 2 2
oq q qλ
∗ ∗< <  1, 1 1
oq q qθ
∗ ∗< <  (15)
Proof. We can get this conclusion by comparing 
Equations (11), (12) with Equation (2) easily.
 Proposition 2 tell us that a distributional fairness 
concerned retailer in the first game tend to be conservative 
in the interaction with the supplier in order not to be 
behind, so as the retailer with distributional fairness 
concern and peer-induced fairness concern in the second 
game. We also find that the second retailer’s optimal order 
quantity is larger than that of retailer 1 when the supplier 
provides them a same wholesale price. It illustrates that 
the retailer’s peer-induced fairness concern make him 
tend to be radical. The double marginalization effect 
and the fairness concern are the possible resources for 
the retailer’s conservation. We can see from Equations 
(11) and (12) that the retailer’s optimal order quantity 
is affected by both the distributional fairness concern 
parameters and the peer-induced fairness concern 
parameter. Proposition 3 will show us how the retailer’s 
optimal order quantity changes with these parameters.
Proposition 3. (1) The two retailers’ optimal order 
quantities are decreasing with their distributional fairness 
concern parameter θr while increasing with the supplier’s 
distributional fairness concern parameter θs. (2) The 
second retailer’s optimal quantity is increasing with his 
peer-induced fairness concern parameter λ.
Proof. We can see from Equation (11) that the last 
term is negative, so the last term become smaller when θr 
become larger, that is, the retailer’s optimal order quantity 
is decreasing with θr. The rest conclusions of Proposition 
3 can be revealed similarly. We can also verify the front 
conclusions by calculating the following equation:
 ( )
( ) 0/
/
2
2,22
2
2,22
2
,2 >
∂∂
∂∂∂
−=
∂
∂
∗
∗∗
qqu
qquq
r
r
λ
λλ λ
λ
 ( )
( )
( )
( )
2 2
, ,,,
2 2 2 2
, ,
/ /
0; 0. 1, 2
/ /
ri i f i r ri i f i si fi
r sri i f i ri i f i
u q q u q qqq
i
u q q u q q
λ
θ θ
θ θ
∗ ∗∗∗
∗ ∗
∂ ∂ ∂ ∂ ∂ ∂∂∂
= − < = − > =
∂ ∂∂ ∂ ∂ ∂
 ( )
( )
( )
( )
2 2
, ,,,
2 2 2 2
, ,
/ /
0; 0. 1, 2
/ /
ri i f i r ri i f i si fi
r sri i f i ri i f i
u q q u q qqq
i
u q q u q q
λ
θ θ
θ θ
∗ ∗∗∗
∗ ∗
∂ ∂ ∂ ∂ ∂ ∂∂∂
= − < = − > =
∂ ∂∂ ∂ ∂ ∂
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Proposition 3 indicates that the more the retailer is 
distributional fairness concerned, the less product he 
orders. And the more the retailer is peer-induced fairness 
concerned, the more product he orders. In other words, the 
distributional fairness concern make the retailer tend to be 
conservative and the peer-induced fairness concern make 
him tend to be radical.
We have analyzed the two retailers’ decision-making 
under decentralized channel, in which they only focus on 
their own utilities and ignore the whole channel’s utility. 
The decentralized decision will not usually maximize the 
whole channel’s profit and it will cause the well-known 
effect “double marginalization”. So we will show how 
the retailers make decision under centralized channel in 
the following part. In the second game, we can derive the 
centralized optimal order quantity q ,o2 m  by maximizing 
the channel’s utility u2=ur2+us,2; In the first game, we 
can derive the centralized optimal order quantity q ,o1 i  by 
maximizing the channel’s utility u1=ur1+us,1.
Proposition 4. In the second game, the channel’s utility 
function u2 is concave about q2 and there exists a unique 
optimal order quantity q ,o2 m  that maximizes the whole 
channel’s utility when θs(1+θs)/(2+θs)<1+θr+λ. The centralized 
optimal order quantity satisfies the following condition:
 ( ) ( )( )( )( ) ( )( )
( )20
2,
2 2
1
1 1 1 1
r s s r s
s s r s r
c wcF q
p pλ
λ θ θ θ θ λθ λ
θ λθ λ θ λ θ λ θ λ
+ − + + + + −
= − +
+ + + + + − + + + +  (16)
Proof. Taking the first-order derivation of u2 with 
respect to q2, we have
 
( ) ( )( ) ( ) ( )( )
( ) ( )( ) ( )( )
2
2 2 2
2
2 2
1
1
2 2
1
1
2 2
r r
r
s r s
s s s
s
s r s
u pF q w pF q c
q
pF q c w c
θ θ λ
θ
θ θ λθ λ
θ λθ λ θ
θ
θ θ λθ λ
+ +∂
= + − − −
∂ + + + +
+ + +
− − + + −
+ + + +
 (17)
Taking the second-order derivation of u2 with respect 
to q2, we have
 ( )( ) ( )( ) ( )
2
2
22
2
1 1 1 1
2 2
s s r s r
s r s
u pf q
q
θ λθ λ θ λ θ λ θ λ
θ θ λθ λ
+ + + + + − + + + +∂
= −
∂ + + + +  (18)
We can see from Equation (18) that the equation will 
be negative when the fairness concern parameters satisfy 
the condition θs(1+θs)/(2+θs)<1+θr+λ, then the channel’s 
utility function is concave about and there exists a unique 
optimal order quantity q ,o2 m  that satisfies the first-order 
condition ∂u2 (q ,
o
2 m)/∂q2)=0. We can derive the centralized 
optimal order quantity that satisfies the condition of 
Equation (16).
In section 2, we have analyzed how the fairness-
neutral retailer makes decisions under centralized 
channel. Comparing Equation (16) with Equation (2), 
we can get the following relationship between peer-
induced fairness concerned and fairness-neutral channel’s 
optimal order quantity: (1) there is q ,o2 m < qo2  when 
θs<λ+θr; (2) there is q ,
o
2 m>qo2  when θs>λ+θr and θs(1+θs)/
(2+θs)<1+θr+λ; (3) the centralized optimal order quantity 
under fairness concerned channel doesn’t exist when 
θs(1+θs)/(2+θs)>1+θr+λ. In other words, the fairness 
concerned channel’s optimal order quantity is smaller 
than the fairness-neutral counterpart when the supplier’s 
distributional fairness parameter is relatively small and 
the opponent trend appears when the supplier’s fairness 
parameter is relatively high.
Proposition 5. In the first game, the channel’s 
utility function u1 is concave about q1 and there exists 
a unique optimal order quantity q ,o1 i  that maximizes the 
whole channel’s utility when < *s si i , where *si  satisfies 
2(1+θr)+ *si (θr– *si )=0.The centralized optimal order 
quantity q ,o1 i  satisfies the following condition:
 ( ) ( )( )( )( ) ( )
( )10
1,
2
1
1 2 1
r s s r
r s s s
c wcF q
p pθ
θ θ θ θ
θ θ θ θ
− + + −
= − +
+ + − +
 (19)
Proof. Taking the first and second order derivation of 
with respect to , we have
 ( )( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )( ) ( )1 1 1
1
1 2 1 1 1 2
2 2
r s s s r r s r
s r
s r s r
u pF q c w
q
θ θ θ θ θ θ θ θ
θ θ
θ θ θ θ
+ + − + + − + +∂
= + + −
∂ + + + +
 ( )( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )( ) ( )1 1 1
1
1 2 1 1 1 2
2 2
r s s s r r s r
s r
s r s r
u pF q c w
q
θ θ θ θ θ θ θ θ
θ θ
θ θ θ θ
+ + − + + − + +∂
= + + −
∂ + + + +
  (20)
 ( )( ) ( ) ( )
2
1
12
1
1 2 1
2
r s s s
s r
u pf q
q
θ θ θ θ
θ θ
+ + − +∂
= −
∂ + +
 (21)
We can see from Equation (21) that there must be a 
critical point that satisfies the equation 2(1+θr)+ *si (θr– *si
)=0. Hence, the second order derivation is negative when 
< *s si i , and there exists a unique optimal order quantity 
q ,
o
1 i  that maximizes the fairness concerned channel’s 
utility. Then we can derive the centralized optimal 
order quantity as Equation (19) showed. When < *s si i
, the centralized optimal order quantity under fairness 
concerned channel doesn’t exist.
Comparing Equation (19) with Equation (2), we can 
get the following relationships between distributional 
fairness concerned and fairness-neutral channel’s optimal 
order quantity: (1) there is q ,o1 i<qo1  when<θs<θr, that is, the 
distributional fairness concerned channel’s optimal order 
quantity is smaller than the fairness-neutral counterpart; (2) 
there is q ,o1 i>qo1  when θr<θs< *si , an opponent trend appears.
2.3  Equilibrium Results
In this section, we will analyze the supplier’s best strategy 
and the corresponding results of the supply chain taking 
the retailer’s optimal response into account. The supplier 
is distributional fairness concerned and he plays two 
stackelberg games with the retailers sequentially. We 
first analyze the supplier’s best strategy and the retailer’s 
corresponding optimal order quantity in the second game. 
The supplier chooses w*2  to maximize his own utility in 
the second game us,2.
Equation (11) implicitly gives an optimal order 
quantity for the peer-induced fairness concerned retailer 
at a given wholesale price. The inverse function can be 
derived from Equation (11) as follow.
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 ( ) ( )2 2 2
2 2
2 2 2 2
s s r
s r s s r s
w q pF q cθ λθ λ θ
θ θ λθ λ θ θ λθ λ
+ + +
= +
+ + + + + + + +
 ( ) ( )2 2 2
2 2
2 2 2 2
s s r
s r s s r s
w q pF q cθ λθ λ θ
θ θ λθ λ θ θ λθ λ
+ + +
= +
+ + + + + + + +
  (22)
Proposition 6. Under decentralized channel with 
distributional and peer-induced fairness concerns, the 
unique equilibrium solution consisting of the supplier’s 
optimal wholesale price w*2  and the retailer’s best response 
q ,
*
2 m must satisfy
 ( ) ( )2 2, 2,2 22 2 2 2
s s r
s r s s r s
w q pF q cλ λ
θ λθ λ θ
θ θ λθ λ θ θ λθ λ
∗ ∗ ∗+ + += +
+ + + + + + + +
 ( ) ( )2 2, 2,2 22 2 2 2
s s r
s r s s r s
w q pF q cλ λ
θ λθ λ θ
θ θ λθ λ θ θ λθ λ
∗ ∗ ∗+ + += +
+ + + + + + + +
 (23)
 
( ) ( )( )( ) ( )2, 2,
1 2 2
1
2 1
s s s
s s
pF q g q cλ λ
θ θ λθ λ
θ λθ λ
∗ ∗ + + + +− = 
+ + + 
  (24)
Proof. By incorporating Equation (22) into us,2, we 
get us,2 (q2,w2(q2)). Taking the first-order derivation of us,2 
(q2,w2(q2)) with respect to q2, we have
 ( )( ) ( ) ( ) ( )( )( ) ( )
,2 2 2 2
2 2
2
, 2 1 1 2 2
1
2 2 2 1
s s s s s s
s r s s s
u q w q
pF q g q c
q
θ λθ λ θ θ λθ λ
θ θ λθ λ θ λθ λ
 ∂  + + + + + + + = − −  
∂ + + + + + + +   
 ( )( ) ( ) ( ) ( )( )( ) ( )
,2 2 2 2
2 2
2
, 2 1 1 2 2
1
2 2 2 1
s s s s s s
s r s s s
u q w q
pF q g q c
q
θ λθ λ θ θ λθ λ
θ θ λθ λ θ λθ λ
 ∂  + + + + + + + = − −  
∂ + + + + + + +   
 (25)
We know that the distribution function of demand 
and the GRF function are both increasing with the order 
quantity, so Equation (25) is decreasing with q2. There 
exists a unique optimal order quantity q ,*2 m that maximizes 
us,2 (q2,w2(q2)) and satisfies the first order condition ∂us,2 
(q2,w2 (q2))/(∂q2)=0. Therefore, the unique quantity q ,*2 m 
sold to the retailer at the optimal wholesale price w*2=w*2
(q ,*2 m) that maximizes the supplier’s utility can be given by
 
( ) ( )( )( ) ( )2, 2,
1 2 2
1
2 1
s s s
s s
pF q g q cλ λ
θ θ λθ λ
θ λθ λ
∗ ∗ + + + +− = 
+ + + 
Then, substituting Equation (22) into the above 
expression yields Equation (23).
While in the first game, the supplier chooses to 
maximize his own utility in both two games us=us,1+us,2. 
Equation (12) gives the distributional fairness concerned 
retailer’s best response function to a given wholesale 
price. The inverse function can be derived as follow.
 ( ) ( )1 1 1
2
2 2
s r
s r s r
w q pF q cθ θ
θ θ θ θ
+
= +
+ + + +
 (26)
By incorporating Equation (26) into us, it is easy to 
derive the supplier’s optimal wholesale price w*1  and the 
retailer’s corresponding optimal order quantity q ,o1 i  that 
satisfy Eqquations (27) and (28) as follow.
 ( ) ( )1 1, 1,22 2
s r
s r s r
w q pF q cθ θ
θ θ
θ θ θ θ
∗ ∗ ∗+= +
+ + + +
 (27)
 
( ) ( )( ) ( )1, 1,
2 2 2
1
4 2 2 +2 4 -
s s r
s r s r s
pF q g q cθ θ
θ θ θ λ
θ θ λθ λ λθ θ
∗ ∗+ + + + − = + + + 
   (28)
Corollary 1. Suppose θr<2, the supplier’s wholesale 
price offer to retailer 2 is higher than the wholesale price 
offer to retailer 1, that is, w*2 >w*1 ; the corresponding 
optimal order quantity of retailer 2 is smaller than that of 
retailer 1, that is, q ,*2 m<q ,*1 i .
Proof. We first analyze the retailers’ optimal order 
quantity. Let
 ( )( )
( )
1 2 2
2 1
s s s
s s
X
θ θ λθ λ
θ λθ λ
+ + + +
=
+ + +
 ( )( )2 2 2
4 2 2 +2 4 -
s s r
s r s r s
Y
θ θ θ λ
θ θ λθ λ λθ θ
+ + + +
=
+ + +
;
 ( )( )
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1 2 2
2 1
s s s
s s
X
θ θ λθ λ
θ λθ λ
+ + + +
=
+ + +
 ( )( )2 2 2
4 2 2 +2 4 -
s s r
s r s r s
Y
θ θ θ λ
θ θ λθ λ λθ θ
+ + + +
=
+ + +
 (29)
Let Z=X–Y, we have
 ( )( )( )
( )( )
1 2 2 2
0
2 4 2 2 +2 4 - 1
s s s s r
s r s r s s s
Z
λθ θ θ λθ λ θ
θ θ λθ λ λθ θ θ λθ λ
+ + + + −
= >
+ + + + + +
  (30)
We can see from Equation (30) that Z is positive when 
θr<2. Then we can rewrite Equation (24) as follow.
 ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )2, 2, 1, 1,1 1pF q Y Z g q c pF q Y Z g qλ λ θ θ∗ ∗ ∗ ∗   − + = > − +      (31)
Equation (24) is decreasing with q, so the optimal 
order quantity of retailer 2 is smaller than that of retailer 
1. Next, we show the difference between the wholesale 
price offer to retailer 1 and retailer 2. Equation (23) can 
be rewrite as follow.
 ( ) ( ) ( )( )( ) ( )2 2, 1 2, 2,
2
2 2 2
r s
s r s r s
w q w q pF q cλ λ λ
λθ θ
θ θ θ θ λθ λ
∗ ∗ ∗ ∗ ∗+  = + − + + + + + +   (32)
It is a common sense that the last term of Equation (32) 
is positive, so there is w*2 (q ,*2 m)>w*1 (q ,*2 m). Equation (27) is 
decreasing in q, and we can get w*1 (q ,*2 m)>w*1 (q ,*1 i ) as q ,*2 m
<q ,*1 i . Therefore, we can get the conclusion w*2 >w*1  as 
corollary showed. 
It is well known that the larger the parameter θr is, the 
more the retailer concerns about fairness. However, the 
retailer’s sensitivity to fairness is not limited in real life. It 
has a greater possibility that θr is less than 2 and it is more 
significant for managers to make decisions. Corollary 
1 shows that retailer 2 tends to be conservative in order 
quantity and receives less favorable wholesale price offer. 
In other words, retailer 2 is in a worse position compared 
to retailer 1, as long as the retailer’s distributional fairness 
parameter is not too larger.
CONCLUSIONS AND LIMITATIONS
In this paper, we establish a distributional and peer-
induced fairness concern framework and then build the 
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utility system in a 1-supplier and 2-retailer supply chain. 
The Nash bargaining solution is used as distributional 
fairness reference and the first retailer’s monetary payoff 
is used as the second retailer’s peer-induced fairness 
reference. On the background of newsvendor model, we 
investigate the role of the retailers’ fairness concerns 
on the supply chain through behavioral analysis. The 
equilibrium results show that the second retailer will order 
less product and receive a higher wholesale price than the 
first retailer in the game with the supplier, as long as the 
retailer’s distributional fairness parameter is not too larger. 
It is the peer-induced fairness concern that makes the 
second retailer tend to be conservative in order quantity 
and in a worse position compared to the first retailer.
We have also analyzed the decision-making processes 
of the fairness concerned retailers when the wholesale 
price is exogenous in section 3. The results show that the 
two retailers’ optimal order quantities are both smaller 
than the fairness-neutral counterparts under decentralized 
channel. Additionally, the peer-induced fairness concerned 
retailer’s optimal order quantity is larger than that of the 
distributional fairness concerned retailer when the supplier 
provides them a same wholesale price. We also find that 
the two retailers’ optimal order quantities are decreasing 
with their distributional fairness parameter while increasing 
with the supplier’s distributional fairness parameter and the 
second retailer’s optimal order quantity is increasing with 
his peer-induced fairness parameter. Then the distributional 
and peer-induced fairness concerned retailers’ optimal 
order quantity is analyzed under centralized channel. This 
paper enriches and develops the previous conclusions in 
a simple dyadic supply chain by incorporating another 
homogeneous retailer into the supply chain, in which the 
two retailers operate in two separated markets. The main 
contribution of this paper is that we consider a supply chain 
with two homogenous retailers who are distributional and 
peer-induced fairness concerned and we get some new and 
important conclusions, which will guide managers to make 
correct decisions in the real transactions with other firms.
Although we believe that our analysis has generated 
some useful new insights, it is important to point out 
some limitations of our model that future research can 
investigate. we consider two homogeneous retailers in 
the supply chain who operate in the same market and 
ignore the heterogeneity of them. Actually, retailers have 
different marketing strategy for themselves since they are 
always different from each other in scale, capability and 
property. Thus, we can’t view the first retailer’s monetary 
payoff as the peer-induced fairness reference simply. This 
paper can also be extended in several directions. First, 
the model can be extended with the supplier using a more 
complex wholesale pricing contract. Second, it may be 
interesting to extend the model by incorporating n-retailer 
in the supply chain and investigate how they divide a 
common pie together in the context of supply chain.
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